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INNOVATION STRATEGIES FOR 
DEFENCE
THE SUCCESSFUL CASE OF DEFENCE MEDICAL 
SERVICES
MATTHEW FORD, TIMOTHY HODGETTS AND DAVID WILLIAMS
Over the past 20 years, the Defence Medical Services (DMS, the umbrella organisation for 
medical provision within the British armed forces) has been innovating consistently and at 
pace within the Ministry of Defence. The result of this sustained effort has led to progressive 
improvement in the outcomes of the critically injured. Separately, it has also led to global 
transformational innovation in support of the response to the Ebola epidemic in Sierra 
Leone. Through planned and orchestrated interventions across the entire organisation, from 
leadership to technology, medical practices to training and organisational design, the DMS 
can legitimately claim to have achieved a ‘Revolution in Military Medical Affairs’. Matthew 
Ford, Timothy Hodgetts and David Williams examine the innovation lifecycle within the DMS 
as it defines its response to the challenges of the changing character of conflict and consider 
the way defence medicine is an example to the wider military.
In September 2015, General Nicholas Houghton, then Chief of the Defence Staff, made a number of observations 
about the future of global security. 
Prominent in his list of seven themes 
were the constant challenge produced 
out of uncertainty and the growing rise 
of instability and threat diversification. 
As far as he was concerned, the question 
was clear: how could the UK match 
its limited capabilities to the multiple 
demands produced by a changing 
security environment?1
The government’s response came 
in November 2015 with the publication 
of the National Security Strategy and 
Strategic Defence and Security Review 
2015 (SDSR).2 Taking a different line 
to previous reviews, this SDSR made 
innovation a key focal point in the 
effort to manage contemporary security 
concerns. Developing innovative products 
and services, the SDSR observed, is 
vital for maintaining an advantage over 
adversaries. However, more than this, 
innovation helps to influence industrial 
and strategic partners and, at the same 
time, promote national prosperity.
In many respects, the government’s 
pronouncements on innovation mirror 
those of the US Department of Defense’s 
third offset strategy.3 Like the US strategy, 
the SDSR seeks to re-fashion and apply 
commercial practices and off-the-shelf 
technologies for military technical 
advantage, not just for today but in 
preparation for future threats. For the 
UK, just like its transatlantic counterparts, 
this recognises that the ‘private sector, 
not governments’ now drives the pace 
of technological change.4 This not only 
reflects fiscal realities, but also the fact 
that the private sector is now investing 
more in research and development than 
the public sector. In 2014, for instance, the 
top 20 global companies had a combined 
research and development budget of more 
than £100 billion.5 With the private sector 
shouldering the burden of the global 
research effort, the Ministry of Defence 
(MoD) needs to find ways to redirect 
and leverage these investments through 
partnering with industry. Thus the SDSR 
focuses on Defence Growth Partnerships 
and Security and Resilience Growth 
Partnerships with the intention of bringing 
together the UK’s universities, small and 
medium-sized enterprises and start-ups 
to develop collaborative and commercially 
aware approaches to risk, investment 
planning and project management.
When it comes to delivering on the 
ambitions set out in the SDSR, however, 
there is still a great deal that needs to be 
defined. This includes: how to transform 
military organisations; how to embed 
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and sustain public sector transformation 
through harnessing private sector 
investments; and how to deliver solutions 
that produce more than short-term and 
costly technology adaptations. The task 
of this article is, therefore, to sketch out 
how an innovation strategy might be 
operationalised so that the MoD might 
optimise its investment decisions. In this 
respect, the article considers the experience 
of the Defence Medical Services (DMS) 
and attempts to show how successful 
innovation might be more widely exploited 
in a British military context.
Defence Medical Services: Long-
Term Innovation Enables Short-
Term Adaptation
The DMS has achieved outstanding 
clinical results which some have described 
as constituting a ‘Revolution in Medical 
Military Affairs’.6 Not only have these 
successes sustained the moral component, 
further enabling momentum on the 
battlefield, they have also underlined 
the government’s commitment to the 
Armed Forces Covenant.7 Despite the 
increasing severity of wounds over 
the course of the Helmand campaign, 
the unexpected survival rate significantly 
surpassed that of the National Health 
Service (NHS). As a result, soldiers and 
their commanders understood that if they 
‘got into trouble’ everything that could 
be done to guarantee their survival and 
future welfare was being done.8
However, achieving these successes 
has been hard won. Only through 20 years 
of continual performance improvement 
at all levels of the organisation, spanning 
technology to governance, has the DMS 
put itself at the forefront of clinical results 
both in terms of military and civilian 
medical practice. Indeed, it was stated 
by the Healthcare Commission, one of 
the three organisations that make up the 
Care Quality Commission, that there is 
much the NHS can learn from the DMS.9 
Key to this has been the balancing of 
long-term innovation cycles against the 
demands produced by rapid deployment 
and the requirement to adapt to the 
changing operating environment. 
No greater example has been the 
innovations in organisation, technology, 
training and clinical practice to support 
the transformation of a field hospital to 
manage Ebola patients in Sierra Leone.10
In terms of battlefield success, the 
foundation for the DMS’s Operational 
Patient Care Pathway is based on three 
mutually supporting pillars.11 In the first 
instance, there has been a conceptual 
revolution in patient care. Central to this 
was the recognition that catastrophic 
haemorrhage from limbs has been a 
major cause of avoidable death on the 
battlefield.12 Establishing the evidential 
base in support of this conclusion has 
taken time and scrutiny of historical 
conflicts. The new concept meant breaking 
away from established civilian practice 
of trauma care that emphasised ‘airway, 
breathing and circulation’. Making this 
change was disruptive and was met with 
Naval Nurse Sarah Butler and Medical Assistant Georgina Francis treat an injured soldier at Camp Bastion’s field hospital in Helmand province, Afghanistan, February 
2009. Courtesy of PA Images/Katie Dawson
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internal resistance.13 Having made the 
conceptual break, a number of doctrinal, 
organisational and training challenges 
needed to be overcome. Advances in 
pre-hospital emergency care capability 
were needed to ensure that the casualty 
made it from the battlefield to the field 
hospital alive. In Afghanistan, the most 
tangible signs of these changes were 
the first aid equipment carried by every 
soldier, the introduction of the army team 
medic and enhancements to the airborne 
Medical Emergency Response Team 
(MERT) to secure and stabilise the casualty 
as they made their way to Camp Bastion.
MERTs and battlefield medics by 
themselves do not represent particularly 
revolutionary practices. The concept 
of bringing emergency medicine to the 
front line had precedents in the Incident 
Response Teams of the 1990s.14 Battlefield 
medics had antecedents in the ‘buddy 
system’ developed by US Special Forces 
in Vietnam.15 When reimagined through 
the lens of catastrophic haemorrhage, 
however, prevention of blood loss became 
the driving concern for those involved 
in pre-hospital care. New technologies 
that prevented blood loss could be put 
into service. Old technologies, some of 
which had previously been dismissed as 
counterproductive, could be reconsidered. 
Thus, even as battlefield medics and MERT 
personnel made greater use of pelvic 
binders and compression and haemostatic 
dressings, older, more soldier-proof 
technologies such as tourniquets, could 
be used in the knowledge that this would 
increase survival.
Enabling the conceptual revolutions 
nevertheless depended on clinical doctrine, 
the second pillar of the Operational 
Patient Care Pathway. In this respect, a 
key enabler for change – one based on a 
much longer innovation trajectory – was 
the work of then Colonel Ian Haywood, 
who in the late 1980s developed a 
military equivalent to civilian Advanced 
Trauma Life Support practices.16 It was 
initially known as British Army Advanced 
Trauma Life Support but then became 
known as Battlefield Advanced Trauma 
Life Support (BATLS) when medicine 
became a concern for all branches of 
the armed forces. BATLS codified trauma 
care, repeatedly demonstrating its value 
in Operation Granby – the name given to 
British military operations in the 1991 Gulf 
War – and during mass casualty situations 
in the Balkan conflicts.17 BATLS provided 
a framework for thinking about trauma 
care from battlefield to field hospital, 
retaining its use even as various aspects 
evolved due to a changing approach to 
haemorrhage.18
If BATLS provided a common 
language for thinking through the military 
response to trauma, then it took the final 
pillar of the Operational Patient Care 
Pathway to provide the means through 
which transformative change was made 
possible. Here, the challenges were 
concerned with organisation, medical 
governance and technology. As discussed 
below, some of these changes were 
imposed from outside the DMS, some 
were a response to budgetary pressures 
and others came from an effort to 
optimise performance.
In the first instance, the Strategic 
Defence Review 1998 reorganised the 
DMS, further centralising and integrating 
the single service medical components 
under the surgeon general.19 At the end 
of the Cold War there were fourteen 
British military hospitals dispersed across 
the country and each of the services had 
separate centres of academia and clinical 
excellence. The peace dividend cuts 
of 1994 forced a rethink and led to the 
closure of all but one military hospital and 
the dispersal of military clinicians to five 
NHS hospitals. By 1997, the Defence Select 
Committee was questioning whether 
the DMS could continue to exist.20 In 
response, the DMS decided to more 
actively partner with the NHS and open a 
centre of academic and military medicine 
at what would become the Royal Centre 
for Defence Medicine (RCDM) at the 
Queen Elizabeth Hospital Birmingham. 
Originally, the RCDM was at Selly Oak NHS 
Trust Hospital, where it officially opened 
in 2001. Although there were initial 
problems managing military personnel 
within an NHS context, these challenges 
were overcome. The net effect of these 
reforms did not produce what some 
theorists of military-technical change 
sometimes characterise as either top-
down or bottom-up innovation. Instead, 
they resulted in the RCDM generating 
the expertise to drive change in military 
medicine from the middle out.21
In terms of clinical governance, the 
need to use the RCDM to institutionalise 
change was brought to a head in 2003. 
During a class action brought by nearly 
2,000 former British military personnel 
suffering from post-traumatic stress 
disorder, the High Court judge, Justice 
Owen, questioned whether the DMS 
had been negligent in keeping abreast 
of the developing state of knowledge in 
psychiatric care.22 Although the case was 
eventually dismissed, the censure led 
to the implementation of new national 
clinical guidelines underpinned by 
technologies that enabled the effective 
collection and analysis of medical data 
through the much expanded Military 
Trauma Registry. The goal was to 
implement a clinical governance model 
that emphasised quality assurance.23 This 
in turn was supported by the greater use 
of a peer-review framework established 
at the RCDM designed to evaluate the 
number and reasons for unexpected 
survival and to analyse every operational 
trauma death. In the process, the RCDM 
became the fulcrum around which a 
shared DMS culture could establish itself. 
This culture was tolerant of and founded 
on a systematic and constructive process 
of rigorous self-criticism and analysis.
These long-term innovations ensured 
that the DMS was ready to field medical 
personnel to Afghanistan and Iraq. More 
than this, however, these changes produced 
a degree of organisational resilience that 
made it possible for the DMS to rapidly 
respond, test and disseminate change and 
adapt to the necessities produced out of 
battle. Thus by 2007, Joint Theatre Clinical 
Case Conferences oversaw a revised and 
expanded Joint Theatre Trauma Registry, 
which made it possible for rear-echelon 
and in-theatre medical practitioners to 
coordinate their treatment plans, ensuring 
that clinician decision-making and casualty 
information were in lockstep as wounded 
soldiers were taken from the battlefield 
to treatment in Birmingham.24 When 
supported by peer review and analysis 
undertaken at the RCDM, decisions taken 
in field hospitals could be assessed and 
further optimisations and interventions 
made. By 2009, it became clear that 
the managerial burden produced by the 
changes to medical doctrine concerning 
damage control resuscitation,25 rapid 
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evacuation, aeromedical transportation 
home (C17A Globemasters equipped as 
flying hospitals) and working within an 
inter-disciplinary and international military 
context was too great. Consequently, 
the DMS deployed a medical director to 
Camp Bastion so that the clinical director 
could remain focused on patient care 
and maintaining quality assurance.26 
Further institutionalised through military 
operational support training and hospital 
macro-simulation exercises, it is only 
Figure 1:  Major Developments in Trauma Care Standards in the DMS and NHS since 1995
Source: Authors’ own work.
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through a combination of multiple long-
term and short-term interventions that 
truly transformational results have been 
made possible.
Understanding the Need: 
From Adapting to Change to 
Disrupting the Organisation
The DMS has innovated itself by continually 
investing in practices, infrastructure and 
technologies that have the potential to 
bring long-term benefit in patient care. 
However, not all of these changes have 
necessarily fallen into preplanned patterns 
following centralised directives. In some 
instances – notably those associated with 
organisation, clinical governance and 
technology – budgetary pressures and 
grand strategic decision-making disrupted 
existing DMS business. At the same 
time, battlefield experience has offered 
continual opportunities to test, refine, 
improve and reject methods, techniques 
and technologies depending on how 
they affect patient care outcomes. In the 
case of long-term investment, external, 
unplanned and otherwise disruptive 
change has enhanced the capability of the 
DMS through the creation of the RCDM and 
focusing on quality. In terms of battlefield 
necessities, the prior preparations put 
in place by the DMS ensured that the 
organisation could rapidly adapt to the 
immediate and challenging circumstances 
generated by war.
However, it would be inaccurate 
to describe this disruptive change as 
institutionalised within the DMS in a 
similar manner to that advocated for 
commercial organisations by Clayton M 
Christensen in his work The Innovator’s 
Dilemma.27 Disrupting the DMS has not 
been a market-led activity. Rather, the 
kinds of innovation this article describes 
have been based on changes that have 
been prescribed by and implemented 
through the public sector. Indeed, much 
of the innovation that has emerged from 
the DMS has depended on enablers that 
have their basis in academic clinicians 
whose defence medical professorships 
are rooted in their NHS practices.
The kinds of disruptive change 
this article discusses, therefore, need 
some further explanation if a case is 
to be made for finding ways to embed 
processes of innovation within the DMS 
such that the organisation can continue its 
transformation trajectory. In this respect, 
the authors assert that the ability of the 
DMS to prepare for future conflicts and 
emergencies will come through harnessing 
the opportunities that the state can provide 
to the private sector to test and embed 
disruptive innovation. This approach has 
more in common with the findings of 
Mariana Mazzucato, who observed that 
the public sector has regularly invested in 
fledgling innovations and in the process 
incubated entirely new markets.28
Thus, the question facing the DMS – 
indeed the question facing the whole MoD 
– is how to plan for and manage disruptive 
changes even as the organisation 
optimises its capacity to make adaptations 
in war. All future operating contexts and 
demands placed on the DMS cannot be 
known, but plans can be devised for the 
kinds of long-term investment that can 
ensure the entrepreneurial state helps 
to sustain adaptation. Given industry’s 
increasingly large R&D budgets, it is clear 
that rapid experimentation will be enabled 
through collaboration with it. Putting 
in place principles of engagement that 
manage the structure of risk and reward 
while resolving procurement and supply 
chain challenges will enhance the DMS’s 
ability to adapt rapidly. Finding ways to 
align DMS requirements with industry’s 
ambitions to develop broad markets 
may involve procurement-linked projects 
under the Small Business Research 
Initiative to help jumpstart opportunities. 
Urgent Operational Requirements 
(UOR) represent an established route 
for resolving battlefield imperatives. 
What this article proposes, however, 
are processes and mechanisms that will 
accelerate the development of solutions 
that cannot yet be accommodated by 
the UOR system and cannot be provided 
through the public sector.
To do this effectively, the DMS will 
need to clarify the relationships it has 
with the NHS to ensure that innovation in 
defence produces longer-term benefits for 
the public. At the same time, the UK needs 
to accept that the NHS is not geared up 
to innovate as quickly as the DMS, given 
the complex military and emergency relief 
challenges the military faces and the 
acknowledged role of defence medicine 
as a first mover in innovation. The clinical 
demands of defence thus lend themselves 
to working closely with industrial partners 
in new medical technologies, but only 
on the basis that the DMS can define its 
business requirements clearly. Generating 
that clarity will demand proper horizon 
scanning, mapping research interventions 
against potential payoffs for industry 
and the NHS, and aligning innovation 
with the regulatory regime and ethical 
considerations that frame research. 
Some of the infrastructure to deliver on 
this agenda is already in place with the 
aggregation of UK defence medicine 
assets in the Midlands. These assets will be 
further enhanced following the opening 
of the Defence National Rehabilitation 
Centre, on the Stanford Hall estate in 
Stanford-on-Soar near Loughborough, 
in 2018. The DMS now needs to move 
quickly to capitalise on this alignment, 
thereby turning the transformations of 
the past 20 years into enduring change 
that will benefit defence over the next 
two decades. In particular, the DMS now 
needs to take the lead and help create a 
med-tech incubator to solve contemporary 
defence medical challenges and at the 
same time lead the way on med-tech for 
industry and the NHS.
Payoffs and Challenges
Sustaining the transformation in the 
DMS thus depends on multiple value 
propositions for various constituencies 
and careful capture and communication 
of defence medicine requirements. 
Industrial partners need to know that 
their investment will lead to commercially 
viable innovations. Commanders will 
rightfully want to know that their soldiers 
are being properly looked after. Soldiers 
will want to know that they are not 
just guinea pigs for industry but rather 
the focal point for delivering quality 
healthcare. The country will want to see 
high standards being maintained and 
taxpayers will want to see returns on any 
investment they make. Putting in place a 
carefully managed innovation incubator 
that delivers on these opportunities 
will require care, business acumen and 
a great deal of effective leadership. 
However, the potential benefits that 
the DMS can generate by working with 
industry warrant the investment of time 
and energy.
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Challenges to fulfilling the potential 
payoffs will nevertheless remain. There 
needs to be a certain degree of realism 
in the way that meaningful innovation 
challenges are formulated. Technology 
bottlenecks need to be accounted for 
and the interfaces between multiple 
disciplines and stakeholders will be 
challenging. Technical issues will demand 
careful testing and validation to guarantee 
sponsor engagement. Commercial, clinical 
and military cultures are different and 
will consider questions of risk, certainty 
and resilience differently. Moreover, 
the private sector, the MoD and the 
armed forces themselves have different 
hierarchical structures and attitudes 
towards bureaucracy. The Defence Science 
and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) provides 
a mechanism for reconciling some of the 
challenges a DMS med-tech incubator 
might produce. However, this will be 
possible only if all stakeholders recognise 
the strategic benefits that can be realised 
from everyone working together.
Conclusion
Nicholas Houghton was clear in his 
assessment of the future security 
environment. Threat diversification and 
instability are becoming major challenges 
for the UK and its NATO partners. In 
recognising this broadening of the security 
agenda, the government’s response has 
developed along several axes. For the first 
time, however, the SDSR has explicitly 
described innovation as a central plank in 
the government’s set of policy responses.
This article has shown that 
transformative innovation within defence 
medicine has been ongoing for some time 
and with remarkable success. Consequently, 
government policy in relation to UK defence 
has some foundation in the successful 
experience of the DMS. Soldier survival 
and unexpected survival rates have been 
well in advance of the NHS to the extent 
that DMS is now recognised to be a centre 
of world-leading trauma-care specialists. 
The DMS is well placed, therefore, to offer 
the benefits of its innovation know-how to 
the rest of the MoD.
Nonetheless, the DMS recognises 
that if it is to further embed, sustain 
and take advantage of the propitious 
circumstances it has created for itself, it 
must continue to embrace the innovation 
agenda that the government set out. The 
DMS is confident of its ability to embrace 
innovation as a core consideration in 
its change agenda and in this respect it 
has already started to define and put in 
place effective networks and structures 
to facilitate the creation of an innovation 
incubator. This organisational device will 
allow the public and private sectors to 
share risks and rewards in ways that will 
benefit everyone.
The DMS has already demonstrated 
a degree of entrepreneurialism. Central 
directives and disruptive challenges have in 
part set the framework for organisational 
change. However, the energy for steering 
innovation has been dependent on the 
RCDM and the evidential base supplied 
by academic clinicians, who have driven 
transformation from the middle of the 
organisation. In the future, if the DMS is 
to be ready for everything from Ebola to 
terror attacks, and disaster relief to war, 
then it must further exploit its unique 
capabilities through investment in new 
and existing partnerships. The potential 
to deliver significant benefits for industry, 
the public good and for soldiers is too 
great an opportunity and ought not to 
be missed. 
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